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COMMENTS
THE RULEMAKING CONTINUUM
PETER

L. STRAUSS*

The two papers we have before us' tell both descriptive and normative stories about current issues of rulemaking. Each suggests, in its field
of attention, pressures that operate to increase proceduralization and
agency responses to those pressures, as well as an attitude toward these

developments. In rulemaking, as in other activities, discretion and order
are in constant tension; one might find in that tension the very engine

that makes the processes of public law go. Like the studies that assisted
the move away from formal rulemaking, 2 and the perceptions underlying
the Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee decision, 3 which quieted the judicial development of hybrid rulemaking, the descriptions here suggest that
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. This Comment is based on remarks
presented at a symposium on rulemaking held at Duke University School of Law on March 6, 1992.
In addition to the participants, Richard Pierce, Philip Richter (Columbia '94), Roy Schotland, and
Richard Thomas provided invaluable advice; the Abraham Buchman Fund provided research support. In footnoting this Comment, I have assumed that the reader will also have read the principal
contributions to this symposium; absent disagreement, I have not provided duplicate documentation
for propositions they richly address. All textual citations to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) are to its codification in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-581 (1988).
1. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statementa Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?,41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992); Thomas
0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
2. See Robert W. Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability:
The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276 (1972):
The actual agency experience with these procedural requirements raises serious doubts
about their desirability ....
It is surprising to discover that most agencies required to
conduct formal hearings in connection with rulemaking in fact did not do so during the
previous five years.... Thus, the primary impact of these procedural requirements is often
not, as one might otherwise have expected, the testing of agency assumptions by crossexamination, or the testing of agency conclusions by courts on the basis of substantial
evidence of record. Rather, these procedures either cause the abandonment of the program
(as in the Department of Labor), the development of techniques to reach the same regulatory goal but without a hearing (as FDA is now trying to do), or the promulgation of
noncontroversial regulations by a process of negotiation and compromise (as FDA historically has done and Interior is encouraged to do). In practice, therefore, the principal effect
of imposing rulemaking on a record has often been the dilution of the regulatory process
rather than the protection of persons from arbitrary action.
Id. at 1312 (footnotes omitted).
3. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
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proceduralization may be perversely encouraging governmental lawlessness; as agencies struggle to meet public and political expectations about
their responsibilities with constrained resources, heightened procedural
responsibilities here encourage the struggle to escape there, or reduce the
extent to which government can afford to tell the public how it means to
structure the discretion with which it has been vested. The developments
they recount, on the judicial side at least, are the product of case-by-case
judicial accretion rather than of systematic thought about the overall activity of "rulemaking"-thought such as might only rarely be expected
to occur judicially. The juxtaposition of these two papers affords a useful
occasion to attempt an overview of the whole spectrum of activity that
can be described in Administrative Procedure Act (APA) terms as
"rulemaking."
Although constraints of time and circumstance limit this Comment
to suggestive analysis, the reader will quickly work out that I believe the
descriptive insights of both papers would be enhanced if they were seen
as less-than-universal pronouncements, and that the normative judgments of Professor Anthony's paper are open to substantial doubt. The
reader will need to accept that much of what follows flows from a general
framework of understanding I will try to sketch out, supplemented by
instincts there has not yet been the chance to track down and test out.
Central to the concerns that underlie this writing is a tension perhaps not
all will see and that consequently seems particularly useful to attempt to
describe. What the APA defines as a "rule" may be binding or not, and
may bind the issuing agency, -members of the regulated public, neither, or
both. The possibilities can be expressed in a matrix as follows:
Regulated party
bound
Regulated party
not bound

Gov't bound
A) Both parties
bound
C) Gov't only
bound

Gov't not bound
B) Regulated party
only bound
D) Neither party
bound

Box A is simple-that is the situation produced by legislative rulemaking. Box D, in which there is no law, is of little concern. The tension
reflects the possible contents of Boxes B and C.
We can imagine cases in Box C-historically perhaps not numerous
in litigation, but nonetheless central to one's sense of what it means to
have a government of laws-in which citizens who are not themselves
bound by a governmental policy instrument seek to hold the government
to the promise that the instrument seems to contain. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated,
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"it is a familiar principle of federal administrative law that agencies may
be bound by their own substantive and procedural rules and policies,
whether or not published in the Federal Register. . .. -"4 The private
litigants in such cases are ordinarily unconcerned with procedural sulficiency; those who are subject to regulation would prefer to have the gov-

ernment declare its position on some controvertible issue of law or policy
and then to be able to hold the government to it. Whereas reasons of

public policy may sometimes counsel against too-easy acceptance of limitations on governmental discretion, 5 the general instincts of a society that

has set its face against "secret law" and encourages citizens to obtain preaction advice from government officials 6 is that this is, normatively, a
desirable state of affairs. Procedural rules that would inhibit reliable ad7
vice-giving, are, from this point of view, to be frowned upon.
It is hard, on the other hand, to find desirable content to Box B, in

which the citizen is bound but the government is not.8 Pronouncements
like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disclaimer Professor
Anthony quotes 9 seem the very antithesis of what we think of as the

"rule of law." If one includes within the notion of being "bound" situations in which, as a practical matter, citizens have few choices but to
follow policies the government has announced, then one easily sees the
normative engine of a contrasting analysis. Here is government not

bound, the citizen constrained. The complaint that comes to judicial attention is voiced by a citizen who dislikes the governmental policy that
has been implemented and who wants the opportunity to object to it.
4. Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493, 1504 n.20, vacated as moot, 738 F.2d 1392 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
5. Thus, the potential for diverting limited resources from prosecution by encouraging sideshow litigation may prompt judicial refusals to enforce standards on prosecutorial discretion, even if
prosecutors have established and bureaucratically enforce among themselves standards respecting
the grading of offenses. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); United States v. RedondoLemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly, "wrong" advice, however honestly given, does not
establish a claim against the public treasury, lest conniving be rewarded and advice-giving inhibited.
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
6. Eg., Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2202 (1988)).
7. Different considerations, addressed neither by Professor Anthony nor by this Comment,
may be present should the government and regulated interests use the development of informal
guidance as a device to limit participation, such as by excluding interested consumer groups. See,
eg., Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8. The cases Professor Anthony describes have this character, although he and I would disagree whether the citizens in all of them would be "bound." A government advisory as to what
conduct will provoke a prosecution is threatening, illuminating, cautionary-but not binding; the
underlying standard, to enforce which the action is brought, is what "binds."
9. Anthony, supra note 1, at 1346.
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The animating normative judgment for me is that of Box C. It expresses a legal state of affairs that I find plausible, desirable, and wellcaptured by the APA's provisions respecting interpretive rules and general statements of policy, inter alia. But one must see the citizen attempting to hold government to its promises to get that perspective; and
when complaints are put in the posture of Box B, this paradigm is easily
overlooked. Professor Anthony's paper is about the cases of Box B, written by judges who appear to have focused their attention on that context.
What is needed is an analysis that also takes into account the traditions
of holding government accountable to the law it creates for itself.
I.
The place to start is with a brief outline of the spectrum of activities
identified as rulemaking for APA purposes. Although commonly we
speak of "rulemaking" as synonymous with the notice-and-comment
procedures of informal legislative rulemaking under section 553, careful
attention to the APA reveals four different species of activity that can
produce an outcome that fits the definition of "rule" given in section
551(4): "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy .... "
First, what is usually called "formal rulemaking" under section 553
consists of procedures by which rules are "made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing [following the procedures of] sections
556 and 557 of this title ....-"1 0 Such procedures are commonly employed for the setting of particular rates, but otherwise it is widely known
that they are disfavored, and will be found mandatory only when a specific statute so requires in unmistakable terms.II
Second, what is usually called "informal rulemaking" requires, in
the section's explicit terms, a brief and rather unspecific notice warning
of "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved," 12 followed by the affording to interested persons of "an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through the submission of written data, views, or arguments" and concluded by an instrument of adoption that includes "a concise general
statement of [the adopted rule's] basis and purpose."' 3 An agency following this procedure can create a legal instrument that, if substantively
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
11. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). For a persuasive and highly
influential account of the failures of formal rulemaking, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1278-1313.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (emphasis added).
13. Id. § 553(c).
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valid, has the force and effect of a statute on all those who are subject to
it. It binds the agency, private parties, and the courts, and may preempt
state statutes. If a statute so authorizes, its violation may form the basis
for penal consequences. In formal contemplation, a valid legislative rule
may be modified only by adoption of an amending rule or overruling
statute. This style of rulemaking has been subject to considerable legislative and judicial elaboration in some settings, and we shall need to return
to consider these developments. For the moment, one important characteristic to note about it is that this formal impact is purchased at the
price of involvement at the agency's head: The adoption of legislative
rules, an exercise of delegated legislative authority, is invariably an act of
the particular individual or body to whom that authority has been delegated-the Secretary, the Commission, the agency Administrator.
Third, what I have elsewhere styled "publication rulemaking"' 4 is
typically effected by agency staff without participation at the agency's
head. For these rules, the parameters are set not by section 553, which
excepts them, but by sections 552(a)(1) and (2). The latter provisions
require certain agency documents either to be published in the Federal
Register before a person can "in any manner be required to resort to, or
be adversely affected by" them, or to be indexed and made available for
inspection and copying or purchase before the documents "may be relied
on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an
agency" to "affect[ ] a member of the public." "Actual and timely notice" suffices to defend the rules' application in either case, however. Section 552(a) is explicit in identifying the documents being referred to as
including "statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency,"' 5 which may or may
not be published in the FederalRegister as the agency chooses, and "administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member
of the public,"' 6 which are to be indexed and made available. Note that
the rather elaborate language of section 552(a) contemplates that if the
agency does follow the stated publication requirements it will be able to
require people to resort to these instruments, and will be able to rely on
them in proceedings in ways that "adversely affect" members of the public; yet more strikingly, it also strongly suggests that even if these steps

14.
STATES
15.
16.

PETER L. STRAUsS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED

157 (1989).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D).
Id. § 552(a)(2)(C).
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are not taken, such materials may be "relied on, used, or cited as precedent" againstthe agency although they do not serve to bind the public. 17
Fourth, and finally, comes the body of materials that fit the APA
definition of "rule" and are in some respects the product of agency process, but that meet none of the procedural specifications of the preceding
three classes. Here we encounter guidance documents that might be
"publication rules" if appropriately made available or if timely and actual notice were given, and also other materials of lesser dignity-press
releases and the like. The public cannot be adversely affected by such
rules; but, to repeat, there is at least the implication that the agency may
be so affected.
II.
The critical implications of this taxonomy are greater for Professor
Anthony's analysis than for Professor McGarity's, but before turning to
that, a few more context-setting observations may be appropriate.
First, the four classes of rulemaking identified above form a natural
progression in several respects.
o Of the four categories, formal rulemaking is the least frequent, the
most stylized, and the most demanding of resources at the agency's
head.
o Informal rulemaking is what we are accustomed to thinking of when
the subject of rulemaking is raised, but a moment's reflection suggests
that it, too, is in relative terms a rare occurrence. Even without regard
to ossification or latter-day encrustations such as Regulatory Impact
Analyses, it requires agency engagement from head to toe as a public
process generating formally binding results, formally determined by
the agency itself.
" No such engagement or formality attends the generation of "publication rules" such as technical guidelines or staff manuals. Staff offices
17. Section 552(a) in its current form had its origin not in the original APA but in the 1966
(original) Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250. The legislative history of
the provision reflects as an unchallenged premise that "policy, interpretations, staff manuals, and
instructions... the end product of Federal administration... have the force and effect of law in
most cases .... ." H.R. RaP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2424. The purpose of the new statute was to bring this body of hitherto "secret
law" out in the open, where citizens could become aware of it and adjust their conduct to it, not to
compromise its influence. See Hearings on S. 1160 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
& Procedureofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1966) (CAB Chairman
Macey favors proposal that would "bind a person who had notice of the terms of a rule, statement of

general policy or interpretation, irrespective of whether it is published in the Federal Register"); id.
at 458 (Acting FCC Chairman Greenbaum characterizes policy statements as "of vital interest to
those regulated by the Commission and are Commission standards and rules in every significant
sense.... [N]o agency has the right to establish such standards ... without making them public.").
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produce them in a profusion that overwhelms the more formal output.
Here are three such comparisons that personal contacts permitted me
to make with relative ease: (1) formally adopted regulations of the
Internal Revenue Service occupy about a foot of library shelf space,
but Revenue Rulings and other similar publications, closer to twenty
feet; (2) the rules of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), two
inches, but the corresponding technical guidance materials, well in excess of forty feet;18 (3) finally, Part 50 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations on nuclear power plant safety, in the looseleaf
edition, consumes three-sixteenths of an inch, while the supplemental
technical guidance manuals and standard reactor plans in the same
format stack up to nine and three-fourths inches. 19 Informal conversations persuade me that these ratios are typical. Although they do not
justify the practice, they do suggest that we will want to consider carefully what this extraordinary volume of standard-generating activity
might be about, and what its consequences are or should be.
* No similar measure can easily be made of the unindexed materials of
our fourth category, yet given the breadth of description and the substantial numbers of potential sources for such rules, we may be certain
that they too are generated in vast numbers and with relative ease.20
Second, upon closer inspection the world of informal rulemaking
may itself be found to fracture along lines roughly suggested by the "major rulemaking" category developed for the exercise of presidential oversight by the line of Presidents from Nixon through Reagan. Some
legislative rules have a major impact on the economy generally, or on
important industries or the like; in numerical terms, however, most legislative rules are much less significant. If we look carefully at the examples
Professor McGarity uses and the statutes on which he draws, 2 1 we find
that they embrace, almost exclusively, the former sort of rules-actions
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or EPA
or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) that
impose impressive costs on one or more industries in the hopes of securing somewhat diffuse improvements in the affected environment.

18. Facsimile from Neil Eisner, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Mar. 4,

1992).
19. Telephone Interview with Joseph F. Scinto, Deputy General Counsel for Hearing and Enforcement Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n (Feb. 11, 1992).
20. For example, the FAA generates approximately 215 feet of domestic and international notices yearly. Id.
21. See, eg., McGarity, supra note 1, at 1403-07, 1414-17, 1423-24.
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Further consideration suggests that as to these kinds of informal
rulemakings, the President, the Congress, and the courts have been moving almost in lockstep to heighten the procedural requirements of
rulemaking. The President has adopted various executive oversight
mechanisms, notably Executive Order 12,291,22 to impose additional rationalizing analysis and/or (you may take your pick) political controls
over these highly significant decisions. Congress has regularly provided
procedures in addition to those of section 553-indirectly, the Freedom
of Information Act,23 which quickly became a discovery vehicle for the
underlying data of rulemaking; directly, special provisions for oral hearing with the possibility of cross-examination of witnesses, for substantial
evidence review, and for other procedural elaborations from section 553
that signal recognition of the appropriateness of greater formality before
such significant actions are taken. And the courts-in part taking their
cue from Congress, in part voicing their own concerns-have converted
the requirement to give notice of the "terms or substance ... or a description of the subject and issues" into a requirement to give notice of
both the precise proposal (so reversal may be had if the agency responds
to comments by significantly changing its action) 24 and the full database
on which the agency proposes to act. 25 Further, the courts have converted section 553's requirement of a "concise general statement of...
basis and purpose" into a requirement of explanation for all substantial
judgments and for all actions on significant comments, sufficiently detailed to permit the court to understand the agency's reasoning process. 26
One need not disagree with either these changes or their characterization as "ossification" to note that they appear to have happened in
what is much less than the full field of informal rulemaking, and that
they appear to have happened with the concurrence of all three branches
of the federal government. While it is hard to present proof, casual
browsing in the Federal Register strongly suggests that informal
rulemaking, generally, is not ossified. The Coast Guard continues to
make its rules on drawbridge operation, 27 the Department of Agriculture
on domestically produced peanuts, 28 in very little FederalRegister space
and in rather good time. The short average period of time rules remain
22. 3 C.F.R. 127 (Comp. 1981), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1988).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).

24. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750-52 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
25. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1211-12 (5th Cir. 1991).
26. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 1401.
27. 57 Fed. Reg. 24,189 (1992) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 117).
28. Id. at 24,354 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 998).
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at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for presidential review, the general brevity of notices and explanations, and the like, all
suggest that ossification is a limited development. And the most salient
characteristic of this development is that, in the general context where it
has occurred, we have chosen it-we want it. One does not otherwise
know quite how to understand the unanimity of the three controlling
branches of our government-the President, the Congress, and the
courts-in the direction they have chosen.
It is appropriate at this point to recall the wisdom of Louis Jaffe:
[I]t makes little sense to criticize an administration for failure to meet a
critic's judgment of what the "public interest" requires. The action or
inaction of an agency acting under a broad delegation is often the result of the political process operating on the agency, and is, after all, all
that can be expected. Indeed, the criticisms of administration must be
recognized as themselves a component of the political process, and
critics' invocation of the "public interest" as a standard with readily
discoverable content should be viewed as but a useful tactic in the
political debate.... The key to success is the strong and persistent
public opinion which demands a response to a given problem, which is
sufficiently organized to press for the detailed legislative solution required, and which
will ultimately keep the administration on the job of
29
implementing it.
It is hard to understand the changes, in the context in which they have
occurred, as other than responses to a fairly "strong and persistent public
opinion" about the utility of procedural checks on decisions of such high
dimension. It might fairly be argued that particulars of the changes are
excessive in their impact-that courts in particular have been insufficiently sensitive to the cumulative impacts of these changes and to the
possibility that, for example, presidential oversight on matters of high
prominence will be adequate in itself to assure close agency examination
and politically responsive agency decisions. 30 But the general direction
29. Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183, 1190-91
(1973); see also HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 98 (1977) ("We
are ambivalent about the appropriate trade-offs between discretion and constraint, each of us de-

manding the former for ourselves and the latter for our neighbors.").
30. Peter L. Strauss, ConsideringPoliticalAlternatives to "HardLook" Review, 1989 DUKE L.J.
538; Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Politicaland Judicial Controls over Administrative
Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1251 (1992).

One perhaps can find hopeful signs of judicial awareness of this problem in the recent practice,
at least in the D.C. Circuit, to treat as a serious question the issue whether or not to suspend the
operation of a rule being returned for further consideration on remand. When the court calls for
additional briefs on that subject and then leaves a rule in place, International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1320-25 (D.C. Cir. 1991), or invites the agency to maintain the status quo
through the exercise of emergency rulemaking powers, Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 748-50
(D.C. Cir. 1991), or delays the issuance of a vacatur to permit adoption of revisions to a rule found
deficient but probably relied upon, United Mine Workers v. Dole, 870 F.2d 662, 677 (D.C. Cir.
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ought not to be surprising to us; and given the way in which it is occurring, ossification must be regarded as a political choice-wrongheaded,
perhaps, but in an important sense what we want.
In any event, the end product is worth noting, as we turn to the
problems of publication rulemaking. We have indeed developed a tertium quid, as Professor Stewart once described it, 31 for high-consequence
rulemaking in the ground between formal rulemaking and the bare bones
of sections 553(b) and (c). Presidential review, additional congressionally mandated procedures, and hard-look judicial review all conspire to
make of such rulemaking a much more strenuous event than the informal
rulemaking norm. On the one hand, it should not be surprising for agencies to try to escape this field of play, so expensive to their limited resources and so conducive to frustrating their choices about how to use
those resources; an impulse to keep the agencies on that field is understandable. On the other hand, if the procedural consequences of forcing
such rulemaking are high, we cannot fool ourselves that the requirement
is a trivial one; in particular, we cannot imagine that a high volume of
output will be achievable if these procedures are to be used. The process
is one we designed to slow important decisions, and it has worked. Its
effectiveness in slowing the rulemaking process is a cost (or a benefit,
depending on who is counting) that will be present whenever the process
is invoked. Thus it may be quite important to be accurate in identifying
which rules must be adopted through this process, so that we catch only
those "rules" for which an agency has inappropriately sought to escape
informal rulemaking it was obliged to pursue. To impose not just informal rulemaking procedures but the heightened requirements of this tertium quid on publication rulemakings could significantly impair a kind of
activity Congress has chosen, perhaps for good reason, to permit on a
significantly less formal basis.
Finally, as to context, the question of what jural effect to give to
publication rules is not settled. Here is where the tension described in
the introductory paragraphs of this Comment arises. As noted, the diction of section 552(a) is at odds with the position that bindingness "in
practical effect" can be achieved only by following procedures at least as
demanding as the notice-and-comment procedures of section 553; section
552(a) seems to imagine that the impact of a publication rule will be
1989), we can understand it to be acknowledging the possibly excessive and disabling discouragement of being sent back to square one; the consequences of agency procedural failures have been
moderated in ways that could significantly limit the ossification effect.
31. Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in
Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L.

REv. 713, 733 (1977).
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rather like that of an agency adjudicatory precedent-not itself "law,"
yet establishing a principle to which the public may be held unless the
agency is persuaded not to apply it, and constraining the judgment of the
agency itself in the absence of some demonstrated reason for departing
from it. Beyond section 552(a) is the line of cases seeking to enforce
publication rules, which suggest that an agency statement outside the
context of adjudication can be binding without being a legislative rule.
As the D.C. Circuit recently stated:
Our dicta on the subject-and that is all we have found-have split.
Some of our opinions have implied that the established maxim requiring agencies to adhere to their own rules, see, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton,
359 U.S. 535, 539, 79 S. Ct. 968, 972, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959); Service
v.Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S. Ct. 1152, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1957), extends to policies or interpretive rules. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Although the FBI has no published
regulation governing what factors may be utilized in selecting a special
agent, internal guidelines and rules not formally promulgated have occasionally been held to bind agency conduct."); Lucas v. Hodges, 730
F.2d 1493, 1504 n.20 (D.C. Cir.) ("it is a familiar principle of federal
administrative law that agencies may be bound by their own substantive and procedural rules and policies, whether or not published in the
Federal Register, if they are intended as mandatory"), vacated as moot,
738 F.2d 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 281

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (remanding for determination of whether guidelines
in Personnel Manual are "mandatory or precatory"); Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d 935, 940-41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037,
103 S. Ct. 450, 74 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1982); Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562

F.2d 701, 717 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Yet other cases suggest that a substantive agency statement cannot be binding on the agency if it is a mere policy statement or interpretive rule. In holding that the Secretary of Labor was not required
to observe his department's mine safety enforcement guidelines, for example, we stated: "It is axiomatic that an agency must adhere to its
own regulations,

. .

.and that it need not adhere to mere "general

statement[s] of policy[ ]."Brock v. CathedralBluffs Shale Oil Co., 796
F.2d 533, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); (other citations omitted)). 32
Cases like these arise when citizens try to hold the government to
what it has apparently promised, rather than when they try to undercut a
declared policy by suggesting that improper procedures have been followed. These cases call attention to the proposition that control of government discretion is'an important good that administrative law seeks to
deliver. Steps that make it easier for agencies to avoid such controls, or
32. Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(brackets, quotation errors, and citation errors in original).
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discourage them from making the pronouncements that might make
their actions more predictable and regular, have costs as well as possible
benefits.
The difficulty of the question is reflected in the persistently painful
body of law that addresses estopping government.3 3 Government attorneys argue broadly, paralleling the arguments for sovereign immunity
largely rejected by modern legislation, that the government can never be
estopped by the representations of its civil servants. The courts, usually
finding against estoppel in the particular, have rejected the claim so
broadly made, hinting that "the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed [in
some circumstances] by the countervailing interest of citizens in some
minimum standard of decency, honor and reliability in their dealings
with their Government. ' 34 In its most recent encounter with the subject,
the Supreme Court held that estoppel could not be applied in cases where
the result would be to require payment of money from the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory appropriation-the argument that underlies
the residual availability of the sovereign immunity defense; other possibilities for estoppel were left open. 35 Treating interpretive rules and
policy statements as binding on government often will require no direct
expenditure of funds; and a straightforward reading of section 552(a)
suggests that such treatment has, in any event, been consented to. Strikingly, the contrary arguments are prudential ones: Permitting judicial
enforcement of "internal" instructions will only discourage the government from providing the instructions, and thus secure regularity of bureaucratic behavior in the usual case-that is, it is not that the
instructions do not bind or should not bind the government officials to
whom they are addressed, but that judicial as distinct from executive
enforcement of their requirements threatens more harm (adventitious
lawsuits, distraction of government efforts, discouragement to the announcement of policy) than good.3 6 The estoppel problem is properly
33. See Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982); see also MICHAEL ASIMOW,
ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 68 (1973) ("The present
case law involving estoppel of the government presents an uninspiring picture of injustice, anachronism, and rampant confusion."); Frank C. Newman, Should OfficialAdvice Be Reliable?-Proposals

as to Estoppel andRelated Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1953); Joshua
I. Schwartz, The IrresistibleForce Meets the Immovable Object"Estoppel Remedies for an Agency's
Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
34. Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984).
35. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
36. Id. at 433-34; see also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981); United States v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979).
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the subject of another essay;3 7 here, it seems enough to point out the
tension that underlies it, and to see that the non-fiscal arguments for declining judicial enforcement of written government policies depend on
precisely the same assessment of the general benefits to citizens of having
advice as Professor Anthony omits from his analysis.
III.
A study of the publication rule problem ought to 1) consider seriously the procedural judgments apparently embedded in sections
552(a)(1) and (2); 2) try to imagine why one might make such judgments;
3) examine the different internal structures for the generation of "policy
statements" and "legislative rules"; and 4) try to identify positive benefits
that might result from encouraging the adoption of publication rules.
The pages remaining attempt to be suggestive about these enterprises, in
support of the proposition that much publication rulemaking is of high
value to the public, and that the public would, on balance, be harmed if it
were suppressed or if agencies were signalled that such advice, once
given, could easily be disregarded. This is not to deny the value of safeguarding against agency evasion of the (costly) procedures for high-consequence rulemakings: If the costs of those procedures excessively
repress desired legislative rulemaking, the proper response-as Professor
McGarity suggests 3 8-is to modify those procedures back towards the
original judgments of section 553(b) and (c), not to evade altogether the
procedural responsibilities of lawmaking. But the APA sharply distinguishes between those rules that are formally binding and require the use
of section 553 procedures, and others that do not formally bind but nonetheless may "adversely affect" or be used "against" a party or to which a
party may be "required to resort." Why might one assign lesser procedural specification to these?
In addressing these issues, the following discussion treats only publication rules that do not purport to bind private actors in a formal sense,
but that a member of the public might regard as significantly limiting
what an agency may lawfully do, or what that person is free to do in
practice. Of course Professor Anthony is correct that only section 553
37. For example, the per curiam opinion in Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 785, characterized Social
Security Administration Manual provisions as not binding in the course of declining to find the
government estopped by its employee's failure to comply with a manual instruction of which the
applicant was unaware. "If only he had followed instructions, I would have succeeded in my claim"
has a different character to it than "I knew of and relied on the agency's published policy, its departure from which was unexplained." Making government explain departures from established policy
is a common and in general highly desirable outcome. See Diaz-Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493 (5th
Cir. 1992).
38. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 1443-44.
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states the procedures by which agencies may adopt standards that in formal terms have legislative force and effect. If an agency attempts to accomplish that result by publication rulemaking, it is simply in error; but
this is easily enough understood, and no data suggest that it is a significant problem. The publication rules for which problems worth discussing arise are those he describes as binding in practical effect-rules that
announce to the public, for example, what Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) agents will apply as their understanding of the depreciation rules
of the tax laws and regulations; or indicate that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) will accept a given set of provisions for
emergency allocation of natural gas, in the event of shortage, as complying with its regulations requiring that every rate-filing by a natural gas
pipeline include provisions on that subject; or state in detail certain design parameters for nuclear power-generating facilities that the staff of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will accept as meeting safeoperating requirements of its regulations. These publication rules are not
formally binding. A Tax Court proceeding may ultimately find that
other depreciation approaches are permissible under the statutes and regulations; a pipeline or a customer disfavored by the suggested allocation
scheme might well be able to persuade FERC in a rate proceeding that
some other allocation was preferable; a license applicant to NRC can
seek to prove the safety of its own design. In practice, however, these
options entail risks and impose costs that many will be unwilling or even
unable to accept. Many if not most people will pay their taxes quietly
rather than confront the IRS; the additional cost of qualifying a design
for safety outside NRC's technical guidelines could easily run in the millions of dollars. Professor Anthony's analysis puts such publication rules
in jeopardy; and in my judgment, that is a questionable outcome.
A.
One line of approach is suggested by the hierarchy of rulemaking
procedures and activities already sketched. Informal rulemaking is both
a less frequent and a more highly centralized form of rulemaking than is
publication rulemaking. The relationship between these two forms of activity mirrors, within the agency, the relationship between legislation and
rulemaking in the larger governmental context. One can imagine a
framework of ever-increasing specificity, in which increasing detail is
provided by procedures of diminishing rigorousness, adopted by actors of
diminishing political responsibility. At the apex lies the Constitution,
substantively the least specific yet the most directly adopted by the citizenry. Legislation is more specific, adopted not by citizens directly in
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any sense, but by those whom they elect as representatives for the purpose. Yet we accept that, in a complex society, the standards Congress
formulates will often accomplish little more than to establish large
frameworks for the resolution of issues, leaving their actual resolution in
detail to agencies created for the purpose, agencies whose political accountability is secured by appointment mechanisms and the possibility of
presidential and/or congressional oversight. 39 And the agencies in turn
find that complex subjects, required procedures, and the twenty-fourhour day limit the capacities of those at the very top of the agency to deal
with their responsibilities; ideally, those at the head take the most important of decisions, creating an internal framework or structure of essential
judgments, and then leave the inevitable further details to be worked out
by their more numerous and expert staff-subject to techniques of control and oversight far more likely to be bureaucratic and procedural than
directly political.
This rather conceptual scheme captures well enough a "physical"
reality in which publication rules outnumber informal rules, which in
turn dwarf statutes, which in turn dwarf constitutional provisions. As a
general matter, we also see more and more particular focus by the decisionmaker as we descend into the details; Congress is more the generalist
than EPA, and EPA's Administrator is in turn more the generalist than
the team of engineers and others who may have been asked to produce
technical guidelines on solid waste handling prior to incineration. At one
level, the use of section 553 procedures may be regarded as a signalling
device by which the agency identifies for the world at large which of its
policy determinations are of such significance as to have commanded the
attention of the agency leadership itself for final determination. 4°
Formally, we recognize, these variations are appropriately reflected
in the varying dignity and force of the legal instruments each process
creates. The Constitution is supreme law; validly adopted statutes control unless legislatively changed, and judicial supervision of their validity
is extremely sparing insofar as questions of authority and policy judgment are concerned. Legislative rules have the force of statutes if validly
adopted, and remain in force until changed by legislative rulemaking, but

39. Edward L. Rubin, Law andLegislationin the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 427 (1989).
40. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Administrative State, in TEL Aviv
UNIV. STUDIEs IN LAW (forthcoming 1992).
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courts will be much more aggressive in determining the authority question respecting legislative rules than statutes. Even in the wake of Chevron,4 1 courts will independently determine the extent of statutory
ambiguity within which an agency is privileged to formulate "reasonable" policy; and "hard look" review of an agency's policy formulations
to determine, inter alia, whether they are indeed reasonable is appropriately more demanding than the "any rational basis" test applied to statutes. Publication rules, unlike legislative rules, are not binding on courts
although they may be entitled to substantial deference; 4 2 the agency may
change them without formal procedure, or may decide to depart from
them in the course of a proceeding-at least where its doing so would not
43
prejudice a private party who may have relied upon them.
One possible way to imagine publication rules, then, is as a means
for supplying additional detail unreasonable to expect at the level of the
agency head, and in a form sufficiently flexible to permit relatively fast
and easy change. If one were to take this perspective, the publication
rule problem would become analogous to the delegation problem as it is
conventionally expressed: Do (statutes and) legislative rules provide sufficient detail to persuade us that the agency head has done as much as it
is reasonable to ask it to do, considering competing tasks, available resources, the public's interest in resolution, and the like? Seeing the issue
as one of "filling in the details" responds to the same impulse as Professor Anthony's too-easy distinction between interpretive rules and general
statements of policy,44 but in my judgment his formulation improperly
limits the publication rule format to interpretive activities as a lawyer
might understand them. Absent that artificial limitation, the issue at
root would be whether sufficient constraint embraces the decision made
to permit us some comfort with the "law-full-ness" of the decision-that
we could say if it were wrong, or if it were a usurpation of authority
properly placed elsewhere on the political grid. It is hard to see how it
could matter, in this context, whether what was being done was to give
detailed content to a word, or to elaborate the physical showings that
would be regarded as meeting a test stated in general terms. A publication rule could explain in detail what the Federal Reserve Board regards
41. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
42. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
44. Distinguishing between "interpretation" and "lawmaking" can have the qualities of a shell
game; authorized interpretation frequently supplies judgments no one would pretend the enacting

body considered (Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, is a prime example). Why that is not "making law" is
impossible to explain. Neither § 552 nor § 553 draws the distinction Professor Anthony proposes,
that permits interpretations to have a bite that policies are denied.
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as a "bank," or it could lay out in some detail the physical parameters of
an airplane part that will be regarded by the staff of FAA as meeting a
rule's specification for resistance to metal fatigue. Calling one "interpretation" and the other "policymaking" does not change the relation of the
two to the framework of statutes and regulations within which they
occur.
The courts have confessed their inability to generate an administrable standard to distinguish, in general, proper from excessive delegations. 45 Could they any better define a test for what degree of legislative
rulemaking by the agency head is sufficient then to permit their staffs to
"fill in the details" by publication rulemaking, subject only to such corrections as may come retrospectively through petitions for rulemaking,
consideration of such issues as may eventually arise in adjudications, or
the like?
Putting the issue this way draws our attention to the proposition
that relief from the impact of publication rules usually will be after-thefact in character-securable, if at all, only through a rather long and
burdensome course of proceedings that most persons subject to such
rules would prefer to avoid. Consequently, "binding in practical effect"
will be an arguable characterization for a publication rule in most, if not
all, cases. If I go to the Post Office to mail a package, and the clerk, after
consulting his manual, concludes that it meets the publication rule explanation of the "damaged packages" that he is required by legislative rule
to refuse acceptance to the mails, that will usually be the end of it. We
cannot imagine that the Post Office must permit its clerk to exercise discretion in every case, treating the manual provision merely as guidance;
nor do we think it must supply me with access to an adjudicatory hearing
in which I can contend that my package in fact meets the requirements of
the legislative rule regarding "damaged packages." 46 If I mail a lot of
packages and frequently meet this inconvenience, I ought to (and do)
have the opportunity to petition the agency to consider the matter, but
hardly with assurance of effective future relief, and in any event with no

45. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
46. The example just given seems useful for its accessibility; the United States Postal Service is
no longer an administrative agency in the usual sense. See Silver v. United States Postal Serv., 951
F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
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prospect of relief for this current mailing. 47 The question is whether legislative rules can sufficiently define "damaged packages"; or must informal rulemaking procedures, with involvement of the agency's head, also
be used to "fill in the details" for the guidance of operational staff.
One could argue that little reason exists to think this issue any more
tractable at the agency level than it has been for courts considering the
issue of delegation. Yet the political stakes for courts in this question are
not nearly what they are in the "delegation" context. Invocation of the
delegation doctrine places them in confrontation with a coordinate
branch of government, which they appear to be accusing of failing to do
its work properly. No similar inhibitions would impede a judicial effort
to encourage agencies to achieve what Colin Diver once described as "the
optimal precision of administrative rules."'48 Just because the burdens
imposed by the tertium quid procedures generate risks of evasion, one
might think the effort worthwhile. Although it would suffer the hazards
that generally attend the use of "standards" rather than "rules, ' 49 judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of agency legislative rule guidance for
publication rule activity would answer directly the recently expressed
concerns about agency evasion of the obligation to make some legislative
rules, without threatening to deny the continued utility of publication
rules. Professor Anthony's proposed inquiry into whether such rules are
binding in practice, would, in my judgment, almost certainly deny that
utility, because publication rules so often are. The difficulties would be
compounded by his apparent insistence that, to avoid the characterization as "binding in effect," an agency must both announce a publication
rule's tentative character and provide a procedural opportunity to seek
an alternative regime before the publication rule is applied.
B.
Why would we prefer having publication rules to not having them?
It seems appropriate to put the question this way, given the relative frequency of legislative and publication rulemaking50 and the limits on the
agency's resources at the top, where legislative rules are at least nominally made. Especially in the technically complex, procedurally larded
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). My opportunities to control the agency's judgment on the petition are
sharply limited. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
48. Colin S. Diver, The OptimalPrecisionof AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 65 (1983).
49. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Peter L.
Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 526 (1987).
50. See supra p. 1468.
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world of the tertium quid, it would be unreasonable to expect that any
significant portion of today's publication rules would appear if noticeand-comment rulemaking were required for their adoption. It may be
useful here to recall Professor Hamilton's findings that the heightened
procedural requirements for formal rulemaking had virtually eliminated
the use of that modality, leading agencies to abandon programs, employ
evasions, or attempt to achieve their ends by negotiated compromise:
"In practice.., the principal effect of imposing rulemaking on a record
has often been the dilution of the regulatory process rather than the protection of persons from arbitrary action. '51 Apart from situations in
which the agency is unable to act until it has completed some rulemaking
(an unusual situation,5 2 the practical outcome of which may be that it is
unable to act), costly procedural requirements may encourage or even
force the agency to act without rules.
Framing the issue in this manner quickly focuses our attention on
the shaping and informing character of publication rulemaking. By informing the public how the agency intends to carry out an otherwise
discretionary task, publication rulemaking permits important efficiencies
to those who must deal with government. Professor Anthony sees in a
potential complainant about the policy judgments entailed in NRC's
technical specifications for nuclear power plants, a party bound in practical effect by those guidelines; an applicant that wanted to strike its own
course of attempted compliance with NRC's legislative regulations on
safety in designing its plant, rather than follow the technical guides,
would have to pay millions more to be able to convince the agency's staff
of the wisdom and acceptability of its preferred alternative. But if the
legislative regulations minus the technical specifications would be adequate to satisfy any obligation NRC has to "make law" on the subject of
safety, should we not instead characterize the effect of the specifications
as permitting most applicants to save millions they would otherwise have
been required to spend in justifying the issuance of the licenses they seek?
From the perspective of an applicant whose chief interest is to build a
plant that will meet NRC standards, receiving such guidance from the
agency where possible is strongly preferable to being left to speculate
about the details of agency policies and to pay for case-by-case demonstration that it has met those policies' demands. The NRC may leave
these issues to determination first in negotiations with uninstructed staff
and then in the adjudicatory licensing proceedings in which the applicant
51. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1312-13.
52. Compare Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (agency failure to make sufficient law prior
to action, the unusual case) with NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (agency free to
choose between prior rulemaking and adjudication in making policy, the more usual case).
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bears the burden of showing that its design will satisfy safety requirements. Do we wish to encourage it to do so?
Permitting the discretion left open by its legislative rulemakings to
be structured by publication rulemaking is valuable to the NRC (or to
the FERC or to the FAA) and to the general public, as well as to the
private parties most directly concerned. Case-by-case adjudication is
inefficient for NRC too; it threatens not only expense but also undesirable variation in individual cases-and particularly so in the staff negotiations that will inevitably set the table for any formal proceeding. Staff
instructions, manuals, and other forms of publication rules are essential
tools of bureaucratic management, by which the expertise of an agency is
shared throughout its structure, and staff operatives are kept under the
discipline necessary to the efficient accomplishment of agency mission.
These instructions need not be from the top in any formal sense, and
usually are not. In any moderately complex bureaucratic structure, policy formulation of this character is made the responsibility of what may
be a fair number of relatively small offices, each staffed by experts in a
particular field of action. What is often a much larger body of operatives
apply these policies to particular cases. Because the policies are set for
them, the operatives need not aspire to expertise. If the policies were not
there, and these operatives were required to act on the basis of their own
knowledge and judgment, agency staffing would be a much more complex matter; even if it could be successful, substantial variation would be
expected. Finally, with such policies in place, the agency head needs
only to watch for signals of distress about them, not to reach an unending
series of discretionary judgments; as a result, its task of control and its
possibilities of effective conversation with its staff are considerably
enhanced.
Putting the matter this way also suggests the high stakes for the
public, including the regulated public, in encouraging the adoption of
publication rules. The usual interface between a member of the public
and an agency does not involve the agency head, but a relatively lowlevel member of staff, earlier we used the example of the postal clerk, 53
but the welfare worker, the District Forester, the IRS examiner, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspector, or the application desk
officer each suggest the same result-responsibility for initial processing
of the public's business. Absent, again, some basis for a judgment that
the agency's body of legislative rules are inadequate in themselves to permit the agency to function, the choice the public faces is between having
the clerk apply his own interpretation of the agency's legislative rules, or
53. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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having his decisions and actions further controlled by the agency's publication rules. As any reader who has faced an audit will likely attest,
bureaucratic rationality is a major protection for the public having to
deal with a bureaucracy, as well as an occasional annoyance. While recognizing the irritations, the affected public (especially the repeat players
among them) will almost certainly prefer a state of affairs in which such
instructions are publicly given and may be relied upon-that is, the
lower-level bureaucrats are to follow them, and higher levels are to depart from them only with an explanation. Such instructions may not
"bind" a member of the public (although like agency caselaw they may
affect or be cited against the public); binding agency staff is their very
54
rationale.
A difficulty, of course, is that these satisfied consumers of publication rules tend not to appear in court, and the valuable functions publication rules perform, especially in constraining the behavior of agency
operatives, consequently appear in court opinions only as asides. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 55 one of the D.C. Circuit opinions underlying Professor
Anthony's analysis:
We recognize that [written guidelines agencies develop to aid their exercise of discretion] have the not inconsiderable benefits of apprising
the regulated community of the agency's intentions as well as informing the exercise of discretion by agents and officers in the field. It is
beyond question that many such statements are non-binding in nature
and would thus be characterized by a court as interpretative rules or
policy statements. We are persuaded that courts will appropriately
reach an opposite conclusion only56where, as here, the agency itself has
given its rules substantive effect.
The guideline in question indicated that FDA would bring no enforcement action for the sale of corn contaminated by aflatoxin, an unavoidable natural poison, unless it exceeded an "action level" of twenty parts
per billion. The substantive effect given the rule was precisely (and only)
that the agency regarded itself as bound. While FDA conceded and the
court agreed that
FDA would be obliged to prove that the corn is "adulterated," within
the meaning of the FDC [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic] Act, rather than
merely prove non-compliance with the action level... FDA has bound
itself. As FDA conceded at oral argument, it would be daunting indeed to try to convince a court that the agency could appropriately
54. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
55. 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 949.
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prosecute5 7a producer for shipping corn with less than 20 ppb
aflatoxin.
Why would one choose to prevent the agency from binding itself in
this fashion? The suit was brought not by corn merchants but by persons
interested in nutritional values whose purpose was either to characterize
the agency's substantive policy as arbitrary or to defeat the effective setting of a tolerance level. Initially, they had succeeded in the D.C. Circuit
on the ground-for which much support existed in statutory languagethat the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act forced FDA to set tolerance
levels by formal rulemaking if it set them at all.58 That judgment was
overturned 8-1 in the Supreme Court, a resounding if not necessarily
convincing defeat, and the case was sent back to the D.C. Circuit on the
premise that the Act did not force FDA to act by legislative rule.5 9 On
remand the court considered two issues-the one under discussion, and
also the question whether it could review a particular decision FDA had
made not to challenge the sale of corn that had been blended into compliance with its action level by mixing corn with excessive aflatoxin and
corn that was well below threshold levels. The latter issue, the court
concluded, was unreviewable as an exercise of enforcement discretion. 60
Similarly, each individual decision not to proceed against a corn
merchant for selling corn with some, but less than 20 ppb, aflatoxin,
would be unreviewable; so also if the practice "became known"; giving
published instructions to its enforcement agents and promising that they
will be respected, however, is the point beyond which the agency cannot
go.
In holding that FDA must use "notice-and-comment procedures in
promulgating" action levels, 61 the D.C. Circuit might be thought to have
found a halfway house between the requirement to employ formal
rulemaking it had previously discovered in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the carte blanche the Supreme Court appeared to have
given FDA. More generally, perhaps the judges were playing out the
implications of public interest representation approaches to issues of administrative law. That is, the difficulty with permitting FDA to give selfbinding signals about its enforcement policy rather than requiring noticeand-comment rulemaking might be thought to be that, if those signals
are unreasonable, consumers who may be harmed by them will have little
if any opportunity to test that exercise of discretion in court. Requiring
57. Id. at 948 (citations omitted).
58. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-58 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
59. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 979-81 (1986).
60. Community Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 950 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).

61. IdL at 949.
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rulemaking, even if the agency intends to bind only its staff, it would be
argued, assures these interest groups a procedural platform (the rulemaking proceedings) from which to make their viewpoints heard; and the
absence of assurance about non-prosecution to regulated interests unless
rulemaking is undertaken is a sort of quid pro quo for the difficulties the
consumer groups then face in getting their interests heard. Such an explanation is suggested by the court's citation to an opinion in which such
62
concerns were explicit.
The other side of this way of looking at matters, however, is that
agencies may not only be discouraged from giving guidance, 63 but worse,
may be encouraged to put such guidance as they do give in a form that
cannily reserves the possibilities for future lawlessness. Consider the
EPA boilerplate that Professor Anthony quotes shortly after his discussion of these cases, properly identifying it as a lawyer's rational response
to them:
NOTICE: The policies set out in this [document] . . . are intended
solely as guidance. They are not intended, nor can they be relied upon,
to create any rights enforceable by any party in litigation with the
United States. EPA officials may decide to follow the guidance... or
to act at variance with [it] .... The Agency also reserves the right to
change this guidance at any time without public notice. 64
The best face one can put on such a notice is that it is a charade, intended
to keep the proceduralizing courts at bay while the affected parties are
given to understand that it is these threats of vacillation rather than the
announced policies that stand empty. Although the public interest representation argument is not without force, it entails a difficult balance of
advantage and cost, even disregarding these incentives to official lawlessness. When the specific language of section 552(a) and the general advantages of encouraging government regularity in accordance with
published guidelines are put in the balance, they strongly suggest that
cases like Community Nutrition are taking the D.C. Circuit in just the
wrong direction. 65
62. Id. at 948 (citing Nader v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 657 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also
supra note 7.
63. See the superb discussion of the Community Nutrition case in Richard M. Thomas,
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Agency Self-Regulation, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131 (1992).
64. Anthony, supra note 1, at 1361.
65. See Thomas, supra note 63, at 155:
In short, under those cases following the reasoning of CNI II, the more unstructured,
variable and undisciplined the agency's prosecutorial approach, the more shielded an
agency's prosecutorial discretion will be from public participation and, ultimately, judicial
review. But, if regularity of agency enforcement action, centralized control of agency personnel, and imposition of public, agency-wide policy are desired-and they are desired by
most critics of unchanneled agency discretion-then a rule that essentially penalizes an
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Would it not be preferable, as strongly suggested by the equation
between publication rules and adjudicatory results in the diction of section 552(a), to treat publication rules as ordinarily having the force of
precedent for the agency and its personnel? 66 Significant differences from
legislative rules would remain. One may assert in the course of agency
adjudication that a publication rule is inappropriate on the facts, whereas
a legislative rule binds the agency adjudicator as well as a court; and an
agency is not permitted to treat departure from the advice of a publication rule as an infraction-it must make its case in terms of the statute or
rule underlying the publication rule. But it does not follow that the
agency or its staff are free to disregard validly adopted publication rules
on which a private party may have relied absent the demonstration of its
inappropriateness. The whole point of the exercise is to structure discretion, to provide warning and context for efficient interaction between the
agency and the affected public. This is the plain implication of the rationale for such rules-and, for that matter, the negative pregnant of section 552(a)(2), forbidding the citation of publication rules "against a
party other than an agency" unless they have been properly published
and indexed.
Even within the class of publication rules, the extent of precedential
force might vary with the dignity of the document concerned. An insightful opinion of the late Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit
captured many of the concerns underlying this Comment. NationalAutomatic Laundry & CleaningCouncil v. Shultz 67 addressed a letter ruling
of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor. At the time, the Division issued roughly 750,000 letters each
year responding to public inquiry about application of the wage and hour
laws; of these, about 10,000 were signed by the Administrator. 68 None of
these rulings were in themselves binding on the public, but they did indicate circumstances in which the Division might seek a judicial remedy,
and their existence might have supported a private cause of action employees could have for violations of the wage and hour laws. The deference likely to be paid the Administrator's views and the significant
consequences of being found in breach persuaded the court that the small
agency for restricting the discretion of its own personnel would appear to be counterproductive.... [Tihis rule is simply bizarre from the point of view of anyone genuinely
concerned about curbing abuses of agency discretion.
66. As earlier suggested, reason not to give publication rules such force may sometimes be
found, for example in the potential interference with enforcement activities that giving them such.
force might entail. See supra note 5.
67. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
68. Id at 699.
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proportion of letters signed by the Administrator, unless plainly marked
69
as tentative, were "final agency action" ripe for APA review.
The court's conclusion carried with it no consequences for internal
agency procedures-merely the fact of reviewability. Even so, the court
was careful to assure itself that the advising function would not be interfered with. As an earlier panel had concluded in resisting review of an
interpretive ruling of the FDA, it insisted upon avoiding an outcome that
might "discourage the practice of giving... opinions, with a net loss of
far greater proportions to the average citizen than any possible gain
which could accrue." 70 The court continued, "advisory opinions should,
to the greatest extent possible, be available to the public as a matter of
routine; it would be unfortunate if the prospect of judicial review were to
make an agency reluctant to give them." 71 The conclusion about reviewability reflects, in effect, an assessment of the force of the agency's precedent; the ruling signed by the Administrator is, like the interpretive rule
published in the Federal Register, one whose practical impact may warrant present review.
Judge Leventhal's care counsels severe caution about Professor
Anthony's proposal. The inhibition attributable to the possibility ofjudicial review, while real, will be considerably less than that attributable to a
requirement of rulemaking-and this would be so even if barebones section 553 procedures were required, much less the heightened procedures
of the tertium quid. Review of a publication rule threatens possible delay
and the costs of going to court only ifit occurs-anevent necessarily less
frequent than publication rulemaking itself would be, and one that will
produce reversal only if the advice appealed from was wrong on the merits. Requiring internal procedures as the cost of giving advice or creating
structure is a cost imposed in every case; and reversal will be automatic if
proper procedures were not followed. Careful attention needs to be paid
to the costs of "mak[ing] an agency reluctant to give [such notice of its
72
views]."
IV.
This essay is itself a tentative opinion; invited as a comment and
written in consequent haste, it cannot pretend to the grounding in research that underlie the essays Professors Anthony and McGarity have
69. See id. at 697.
70. Id. at 699 (citing Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1943)).
71. Id. at 699-700.
72. Id. at 700. For a cogent account of these costs in one state where Professor Anthony's
proposals were statutorily adopted, see Michael Asimow, California UndergroundRegulations, 44
ADMIN. L. REv. 43 (1992).
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written. 73 It does not attempt to say how to tell an interpretive rule from

a legislative rule-rather, just to indicate that the stakes seem both
higher than and different from those that the cases and Professor
Anthony have generally discussed, and that a "binding in practical effect" approach will sweep with undesirable breadth. 74 It will have succeeded if it promotes thought about the benefits of receiving advice, and

the costs of inhibiting that by proceduralisms-thought that at the moment seems to me missing from the analysis. The courts seem to be see-

ing particular "trees," individuals who have complaints about the impact
on them of advice they do not like. They seem not to be seeing the general advantages of receiving advice, the benefits of bureaucratic regularity, and the ways in which their approach may undercut both.
Undoubtedly, it is desirable for agencies to engage in consultation as

they develop important interpretations-advice repeatedly given, for example,,by the Administrative Conference of the United States 75-and in-

dications are that this is often done. Consultation can be helpful to an
agency that may wish its advice to be well informed, respected, and understood. But perhaps no Federal Register notice appears, or in some

other ways a shortcut is taken past the usual regimes of section 553 or
the tertium quid.7 6 Imposing the procedural requirement in the latter

terms will have consequences beyond promoting good practice. Undoubtedly too, cases will remain in which courts will conclude that legislative rulemaking is required for work that an agency is trying to
accomplish by publication rules. The Supreme Court's enigmatic deci-

sion in Morton v. Ruiz77 may be an example of a case in which the agency
73. Such research does underlie Thomas, supra note 63, and Asimow, supra note 72.
74. The Administrative Conference of the United States recently adopted two recommendations that bear on my debate with Professor Anthony-Recommendations 92-1 and 92-2. Recommendation 92-2 is reprinted as an appendix to Professor Anthony's Article in this issue of the Duke
Law Journal. Focusing on the references to "independent basis" in note 3 and Part III of Recommendation 92-2, I would argue that I won; but Professor Anthony might claim he did. What is clear
is that the Recommendation applies to the situations Professor Anthony and I agree about-where
the agency tries to treat its policy as an independent source ofobligation. His wish to extend the rule
to "practical effect"-our disagreement-was in my judgment rejected.
75. E-g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 92-1, The Procedural and Practice Rule Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-I); Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation No. 92-2, Agency Policy Statements (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2); Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 76-5, Interpretive Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992).
76. This was the procedural posture of the Community Nutrition case, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 55-62.
77. 415 U.S. 199 (1974); see WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 312-14 (8th
ed. 1987); Ralph F. Fuchs, Development and Diversificationin Administrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw.
U. L. REv. 83, 101-02 (1977).
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had not sufficiently employed legislative rulemaking to permit the use of
publication rules; or it may reflect, more simply, a failure of adequate
publication of what might have been a proper publication rule (a manual
provision embodying the challenged interpretation). In my judgment,
however, its most important thrust lies in its insistence that ad hoc decisionmaking by low-level bureaucrats must be avoided. The regrettable
and perverse impact of strongly discouraging publication rulemaking
would be sharply to diminish the effective resources available to control
the exercise of low-level discretion.

